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Badania etnolingwistyczne zdobyly w ciqgu ostatnich dwu dekad znaozna 
populamosc. Najwazniejsz^ formuh\ nietaforycznn okreslajqcii glowny przedmiot tych 
badaií jest .jçzykowy obraz swiata”. W zwiqzku z tym. iz powstaj^ obecnie projekty 
studiów komparatyslycznych na duzíi skalç, warto byt moze rozwazyc, czego takie 
ujçcie etnolingwistyki nie uwzglçdnia. Wizualna metafora obrazów implikuje, ze 
mówincy si\ w slanie wyjsc ix>za swiat i patrzec nan (oraz nazywac go) z zewmprz. 
Artykul oinawia dwie kcinsekwencje tej inetafory, które mog^ przysporzyc problemów. 
Po pierwsze, wyizolowanie jçzyka ze swiata ludzkich dzialan, którego jyzyk wszak jest 
czçsci^. prowadzi do przyjçcia kognitywistycznego modeln znaczenia jako oddzielnego 
stmmienia komunikaeji. Taki model nie pasuje do eodziennego doswiadezenia prze- 
zroczystosci jyzyka. Po drugie, wyizolowanie jçzyka z zycia sprzyja stosowaniu metod 
„bezczasowych” oraz studiom nad stowami wyalKtrahowanymi z sytuaeji, w której 
zostaly one uzyte (jesli nie wyjçtymi z kontekstu). Przyjmuj^c takie metafory i inetody, 
inozetny stracic z oczu znaczn^ czçsc tego, co jest istotne dla jyzyka poUx;znego — 
przedmiotu badan etnonauki.
Etlinolinguistic research attenipting to reconstruct “linguistic pictures of the 
world” has gained substantial [xipularity over the last two decades. The promi- 
nence of this research in several European countries has brought to the fore the 
question: How can “linguistic worldviews” be studied in such a way that the re- 
sults can be conipared across languages? This question is being addressed within 
the Etlinolinguistic School of Lublin, wliere a large-scale comparative project is 
taking shajie (Bartminski, 2005, 2006, in press). As Bartmihski argues, lbur tyjies 
of decisions have to be made in order to delimit the topic sufTiciently to make it 
researchable, and the results coniparable:
1) The tertiwn coniparationis has to be determined. According to Bartmihski, 
words, concepts, or objecLs can all fit the purpose.
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2) A linguistic register has to he chosen for comparison. Coniparing everyday 
talk in one language with ritual formulas in another has often lead to the exoticisa- 
tion of the “other” language (Bloch, 1989). Bartminski suggests the comparison of 
everyday language, since it is the fundamental register in each speech community.
3) The ohject of the study has to he delimited. This requires an agreement 
within a team of researchers — the projeet initiated by the ethnolinguistic school 
of Lublin might focus on social auto- and heterostereotypes, spatial and temporal 
concepts, as well as names for values.
4) Finally, tlie data to be collected liave to be determined. These traditionally 
involve information on the language system (taken front dictionaries and grant- 
ntars), as well as collections of texts and, if available, corpora. Bartminski also 
suggests the investigation of Speaker intuitions with the use of questionnaires.
Bel'ore embarking on a large-scale projeet such as the proposed comparative 
investigation of linguistic worldviews, it might be worth reflecting on what this 
conceptualisation of ethnolinguistic research excludes. How does the metaphor of 
the “picture of the world”, associated with words in the form of ideational “snap- 
shots”, bound our enquiry? Does it do justice to intuitions about the significance 
of particular languages for the shape of our thinking and acting?
In taking up this issue, I would like to use my personal knowledge of living 
a multilingual life as the starting point. On the basis of my experience, I do have 
a feeling that events take different courses in my different languages. Emotional 
discussions with my wife take a different course depending on whether they take 
place in Polish or in German. Questions from a German work colleague receive an 
answer, while questions from an English colleague lead to “banter” — even if not 
very skilfully conducted on my part. Hence, life takes different courses in different 
languages.
At the same time, I cannot say that I ever encounter different “worldviews”, 
or “pictures of the world”, in the different languages I live in. It never happens 
that I think, when talking in English to a colleague: “I have just thought differently 
here than I would have in German”. Or: “I have a different view of this concept 
tlian I would have in German”. If living with different languages involves different 
“thouglits”, or different “pictures of the world”, it does so only upon rellection. 
While living in a second language, the language is transparent — everything just 
goes its “normal” course.
I wonder, therefore, whether the visual metaphors of “linguistic worldviews” or 
“pictures of the world” fully do justice to the significance of language diversity, as 
it is attested by the experiences of bilinguals (Besemeres, 2002; Pavlenko, 2006; 
Wierzbicka, 2004). The main methodological contention that I wish to make is 
that the meaning o f words in, and for, everyday activities is different from the 
meaning of words as they are reconstrueted through the researcher’s rellection and
Linguistic pictwrs o f the worid or language in llie wortcH 53
interpretation. However, the niethods of ethnolinguistic research, brieily alluded to 
above, heavily rely on reflection (die researcher’s or an “ordinary” speaker’s) as 
well as interpretation of texts (songs, poems). Wliat both these methods have in 
common is that they take language out of its Situation of everyday functioning — 
even when they leave it in the linguistic “context”. By doing this, they give the 
language under investigation a detached, timeless quality that is does not normally 
have. Tlie main bcxly of this essay will aim to show that the locus on methods 
that involve “detaching” procedures corresponds to and is supported by entrenched 
ways of thinking about the “linguistic picture of the world”. But first, let me give 
you an example which might illustrate why I feel that the significance oflanguage 
diversity is not appropriately captured in the metaphor of pictures.
Discussing expectations in Polish and German
When my wife and I started living together, we would sometimes have conver- 
sations about dilTerences in our expectations regarding daily life. Typically, these 
discussions-cum-atguments would concern the consideration shown for the otlier. 
To take a fictive, but entirely realistic, example: Imagine I had beeil in town to deal 
with some chore that had been bothering me; maybe there was a form that I had 
to turn into my bank ofhee. Upon coming home, my wife would point out that she 
also needed to get something done in town; say, there was a parcel for her waiting 
to be collected front tlie post office. Clearly, 1 could have done this since I was 
in town anyway — if only 1 had thought of it. The crucial adjacency pair of such 
conversations would look like this:
( 1)
Me: No nie inyslalein o
PART not think-PST-lSG PREP
I didn’t think ahout your parcel.
Wife: Przyktv ini ze nie pomyílateá.
PART sorry to ine that not think-PST-2SG
And l ’m sorry that you didn’t Üiink (alxmt it).
Front ltere, the conversation would go downhill.
Only later did I realise that, in these nionients, I was really speaking German, 
just using Polish words. Specifically, I was understanding tlie Polish pnykro mi 
( ‘to nie it is przykro'; Wierzbicka (2001, p. 340) suggests “it is painful to nie” 
as a literal translation) as being the sanie as the German tut mir leid (‘it does nie 
pain”). The German tut mir leid can only be used to express remorse for something 
bad that was done by the Speaker — in which case it is similar to the English l ’m 




In the describetl Situation my wife was clearly unhappy witli nie, so tut mir leid 
could only be understcxid as an ironic Statement, something like: / am sorrv (for 
you) that you weren't clever enough to think about this.
Przykro mi is indeed used in situations of expressing remorse or compassion, 
and the dative construction of both przykro mi and tut mir leid probably led me 
to “using” both in the same way. What [ had not realised at the time was that 
przykro mi also has a use that would simply not be expected in German. It can 
mean something similar to English IJeel hurt. That is, it is possible for me to l'eel 
przykro both because of bad things that I have done to somebody eise (l'm sorry) 
and because of bad things that somelxxly eise has done with respect to me (l ’m 
hurt). To express a feeling of przykro means to bemoan a jierceived lack of gcxxl 
feelings between two jieople (Wierzbicka, 2001). In sum, while I tcxik the response 
przykro mi to be cold and ironic, it was really an appeal to mutual warrnth.
This little anecdote might serve as an example of a cross-linguistic misunder- 
standing. However, I feel that regarding it simply as a misunderstanding misses 
some crucial facts that 1 want to focus on in the present discussion. Note that we 
were still relatively successful in our activity of discussing expectations: both of 
us were clear about what it is that we are doing (namely, discussing expectations). 
Botli of us understcxxl at least that my wife would like me to think of her chores 
as well as mine, and that I was not really happy with such an expectation. Both of 
us understocxl that we were both unhappy with the other’s expectations. The use 
of the word przykro, rather than “expressing” a self-sufiicient meaning, was part 
of a further structuring of this activity. In a conversation between two native spe- 
akers of Polish, it would have led the discussion towards confirmations of mutual 
wamitli. In our conversation, it led towards an argument, because I reacted to it as 
to an expression of hostility. It feels inappropriate to say that my wife and I had 
different, incommensurable, “pictures” of przykrosc. If this was the case, we would 
hardly have beeil able to make any sense of what each other was saying. It seems 
niore appropriate to eonsider our verbal exchanges as one dimension of a larger, 
nieaningful Situation.
The crucial thing illustrated in this example is the complete transparency of 
language as a part of activities. The only reason I started rellecting 011 the Situation, 
and eventually understood why things were taking a bad turn, was that something 
unpleasant was happening, and that there seemed to be some systematicity to the 
downliill turns some conversations Uxik. In the Situation, the word przykro did 110t 
attract interpretation. The event, or activity, that was “there” for us at the time 
was a discussion about expectations, about what each of us should or should not 
be expected to do. For me, it seemed normal to be thinking primarily about my 
individual responsibilities. For my wife, it was clear that anything that any of us 
had to do was part of our shared obligations. Clearly, I did 110t “think” at the time
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about any of the facLs used to explicate the use of przykro mi and of tut mir leid 
above: I did not think about dative constructions, the range of contexts of the two 
phrases etc. Wlien I “took” przykro mi to mean something like tut mir leid, this does 
not mean that I “interpreted” it as such, there and then, but rather that I reacted to 
the Situation as if my wife had said tut mir leid. I was absorbed in our attempt to 
find a common ground conceniing (the limits of) mutual expectations.
Nevertheless, it does seem appropriate to say that the course of this attempt 
was built by our languages. We moved through the conversation according to the 
trajectories of different semantics. This, to me, seems to be the fundamental way 
in which language plays a role in a person’s life: many of the activities that we 
concern ourselves with are sfi-uctured linguistically and take a course that is consti- 
tuted linguistically. It seems to me that this fundamental level is missed when we 
restrict our ethnolinguistic research to reconstructions of word-meanings outside 
of the activities that diese words are part of.
This methodological restriction in turn is supported by the metaphors that eth- 
nolinguists use to grasp linguistic meaning — metaphors which restrict language 
to a kind of “intellectual tcxil”.
Metaphors for meaning
Words seemingly “automatically” direct our activities, so far as these are lingu­
istically constituted. Przykro mi as part of the activity of discussing mutual expec- 
tations direcLs this activity towards the problematisation of mutual care and con- 
cerns. Intuitively, the same activity in German seems to be directed linguistically 
towards the highlighting and defending of “borders” of individual responsibility 
(including responsibilities towards the oüier). But what does it mean to say Üiat 
linguistic constructions (such as words) “function” like that?
According to Wierzbicka, cultural keywords, such as przykro, are associated 
with “scripts” (2005) or “scenarios” (2001) which define their meaning. In order to 
projxirly use and undei-stand the word, one first has to know this meaning. Wierz­
bicka (2001, p. 343) argues that the following “cognitive scenario” is associated 
with the word przykro:
(2 )
Byio mi przykro
(a) I feit something bad
(b) because 1 tliouglit:
(c) someone did something
(d) Because of this someone eise could think
(e) “this person doesn’t feel anything good towards me”
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The theatre- or filni-metaphors of “scripts” and “scenarios” suggest that these 
have a priniacy with respect to actual behaviour: first the actor has to leani the 
script, tlien he can act it out. Presumably, these terms have entered Wierzbicka’s 
thinking not directly from the realm of tlieatre and film, but through research in 
the cognitive Sciences: the idea that observable behaviour is a “surface” phenome- 
non that is caused by “underlying” intentions is an idea that is so entrenched in 
psychological and philosophical thinking that it has become virtually “obvious” in 
the discourse of cognitive science. The concept of scripts was introduced into this 
context by AI researchers (Schank & Abelson, 1977) in an attempt to model me- 
aningful activity in a Computer system: since acts are meaningful as parts of larger 
activities, the “underlying” cognitive system must “know” about tliese activities in 
order to cause the right acts. “Scripts” were envisaged as a level ol' “underlying” re- 
presentation that informs the representation of specific concepts so as to guarantee 
meaningful acts.
The important point in our discussion is that the talk of scripts fimily places the 
discussion of cross-linguistic differences in a “cognitivist” context: the difference 
between languages is that different languages are accompanied by, or ratlier cause, 
different “thoughts”. Furthermore, these thoughts are “located” in the mind of the 
Speaker: in “the cognitive system”, in scripts, concepts, stereotypes, or scenarios. 
To communicate verbally, then, means to relate the outside “fomts” of language to 
inner representations, the results of which will be meaning and understanding.
The metaphor of the “linguistic picture of the world” has a very different pro- 
venance within academic discourse. Its genesis is related to the Kantian notion of 
Weltanschauung, which has beeil translated into English as worldview, and the idea 
of a linguistic worldview has beeil developed in German 19ül Century philosophy, 
in particulai- by W. von Humboldt, who used the term sprachliches Weltbild (lingu­
istic picture o f lhe world). The visual metaphor of a linguistic worldview, or picture 
o f the world, inevitably draws tlie attention to the “cognitive” aspects of language 
— to the ways in which language supposedly makes its Speakers “see” the world 
in a jieculiar way, that is, perceive, categorise, and interprel it.1
In essence, to have a worldview requires tliat the person can step out of his 
world and have a gcxxl lcxik at it. However, tliis tyjie of meta-thinking appears 
more characteristic of the time-intensive “tlieoretical practice” (Bourdieu, 1977) 
of academics than the activity of everyday life that such specialised practices tue 
based upon. In ethnolinguistic thinking about tlie significance of language diversity 
we therefore find the same reliance on temporal detachment from life that is also
'This locus on language as a tool for tlie intelleclual "treatment" of the world is nol restricted 
to research which has taken visual imagery as its leading metaphor. For example, according to one 
of the more famous quotes from Whorf. the significance of language diversity lies in the fact that 
languages vary in the ways they “dissect” the world (Carroll, 1956. p. 212).
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characteristic of the “timeless” research procedures described earlier. Sure enough, 
the nietaphor of the “picture” is appropriate in some contexts: there seenis nothing 
wrong with saying that Thomas Mann’s Buddenbrooks paints a certain picture of 
German family life in the 19ll) Century. This is appropriate because die text of 
the novel exists as an object to be reflected upon. In the same way, we can, and 
sometimes do, treat words as objects of reilection. But is this the fundamental way 
in which words figure in human lives? It sounds much less appropriate to talk of, for 
example, the “linguistic picture of the world of the child”. Fundamentally, language 
is a transparent aspect of life, and as such very much unlike a gcxxl picture.
Both the metaphors o f  “scripts” or “scenarios”, and the nietaphor o f  the “lingu­
istic picture o f  the world”, embody ways o f  thinking about (linguistic) meaning as 
something that involves a degree o f  indirectness. Being engaged in meaningful ac­
tivity, according to these metaphors, nieans to behave in ways that first becom e “ca- 
librated” in the places where the meaningful stuffhappens: in the Speakers “mind”, 
which carries the scripts, scenarios and stereotypes that together constitute tlie lin­
guistic picture o f  the world. These representations are not themselves part o f  the 
world in which (linguistic) activities take place —  they live in a remote sphere o f  
thoughts.
In this respect, diese metaphors conceive of language as a “code” Üiat is se- 
parated from die world. However, this idea is in fact not at all consistent with 
the intuitions of ethnolinguists. For example, Lublin ethnolinguists emphasise the 
togetherness of linguistic and odier aspects of meaningful activities by calling 
these other aspects “with-linguistic” (przyjçzykowy) rather dian, as is usual, “non- 
linguistic” (Bartmihski, 1996). Still, the detachment of language from meaningful 
activities, and of “linguistic meaning” from “non-linguistic meaning”, is deeply 
entrenched, and can survive even outright rejections of die idea of language as a 
“code’:
(3)
"A language is not a code for encoding pre-existing meanings. Radier, it is a conceptual, expe- 
rienüal and emotional world” (Wierzbicka, 2004, p. 102).
Although Wierzbicka rejects die code-metaphor, slie does talk of language as 
“a world”, radier than part of “the world” which also includes people, places and 
activities. But the idea of language as a separate world, with linguistic meaning as 
a separate kind of meaning, seems implausible. For example, note that the interac- 
tions between my wife and myself were not entirely meaningless — they just did 
not take the course that we would have hojied. If linguistic meaning was a sepa­
rate “stream” of conimunication, the breakdown of understanding would have beeil 
complete. The fact that this was not the case indicates that understanding might be 
better thought of as a goal that can be reaehed through conimunication, radier than
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as a condition of the “functioning” of individual words and utterances, depending 
on the niatching of form with representation.
The issue of the theoretical detachment of linguistic meaning from situated 
activity notwithstanding, the intuitions expressed by Wiei-zbicka on the basis of 
her personal knowledge of living a bilingual life go beyond tlie cognitivist notion 
of language as a “carrier of thoughts”. Still, tlie metaphors of scripts and scenarios 
which she uses in her analyses stay firmly within these boundaries. Why is this so?
The debate on “Language and Thought”
The dominant metaphors of ethnolinguistics highlight the role of language in 
“thinking”, where tliinking is understcxxl as a sell'-contained activity in the per- 
son’s mind: A detached, rellective activity most reminiscent of scientific, theore­
tical practice. To be sure, tlie example provided above does show the “influence” 
of language on thinking: in a Polish sjieaking life, in which appeals for mutual 
wamith, care and consideration are woven into many activities, Speakers develop 
the skill to constantly think about tlie otlier: tlieir worries and needs, tlieir cho­
res, etc. In this sense, sjieaking has a long-term significance for die development 
of “thinking-about-others” as a tyjie of skill. But this is quite different from the 
cognitivist notion of thoughts as prerequisites for meaning.
Cognitivist metaphors also tend to jxirtray linguistic meaning as an individu- 
ated entity: a script, scenario, stereotyjie or image linked to the form of language 
by “association”. The focus on “thoughts”, and the individuation and Separation 
of “linguistic meaning” have beeil the terms for debating the significance of lan­
guage diversity in 20th Century linguistics, and arguable earlier.2 Understanding 
linguistic meaning as a self-contained representation, and thinking as a rellection 
that uses representations, has led to the consideration of three possible relations be- 
tween “language and thought”. Firstly, thinking might be going on “in” language. 
This intuition seemed to be 110t too far from die minds of ethnolinguists working 
before the rise of cognitive Science. However, the idea that thinking hajijiens “in” 
a language that it cannot get out of proved intuitively uncomjielling — clearly, it 
is not tlie case that all sjieakers of a common language think tlie same. The re- 
mailiing alternative therefore seemed to be: language and thought are two largely 
indejiendent tyjies of tepresentation, or ctxle. Some jireferred to tliink that language 
mainly “exjiresses” thoughts, otliers that tliere is also some influence in the otlier 
direction: that language can “restructure” thought. What is common to these aji- 
proaches, and embodied in the detachment of linguistic meaning front meaningful
2Heidegger criticised Humboldt as tlie main proponent of an instrumentalistic notion of language, 
but some commentators have regarded this criticism as unjustified (see Wohlfart. 1996).
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life, is the conviction that the “serious business” of thinking and understanding is 
essentially non-linguistic.
How deeply entrenched these terms o f  the debate still are in Contemporary 
linguistics is illustrated by the curious Situation that has arisen in recent research 
on “linguistic relativity”. The idea that language is important for the ways in which 
people lead meaningful lives is now heilig addressed by studying people engaged in 
tasks that are hardly meaningful, while making sure that they don’t use language. 
The best known example is probably research on spatial “frames o f  reference” 
(Levinson, 2003): Speakers o f  som e languages locate objects and places by using 
“absolute” terms, such as “north” and “soutli”, rather than “relative” terms, such 
as “left” and “right”. Levinson and colleagues aimed to test whether Speakers o f  
these languages think about spatial location in absolute terms, in addition to talking 
like that. In a typical task, Speakers were asked to memorise the order in which toy 
cow s were placed on a table, and to recreate tlie same order after being rotated 180 
degrees. Speakers o f  “relative” languages predominantly recreated the order so that 
it was tlie same in relative terms, whereas Speakers o f  “absolute” languages chose  
the “absolute” solution. The aim was to demonstrate that it is not “just” spatial 
language that is absolute for som e Speakers, but also spatial thought. The logic o f  
the experiment depends on the questionable assumption that humans memorise the 
order o f  toy cow s without using linguistic terms, i.e. in a non-linguistic way.
The Separation of language from meaningful activity means that the debate has 
become trapped between universalists who claim that thinking “really” happens in 
a set of universal concepts (Fodor, 1975; Pinker, 1994) and relativists who claim 
that the “language of thought” is iníluenced by the “surface” language of the com- 
munity (Levinson, 1997).3 In this way, recent research on “linguistic relativity” 
both over- and understates the significance of language diversity: it overstates it in 
so far as it cannot entirely get away from suggesting a determining role of langu­
age, foreclosing an understanding of the essential openness of language to mutual 
understanding; and it understates it insofar as it necessarily focuses research efforts 
on areas of life that tue most amenable to non-linguistic experimentation, such as 
object location (Majid, Bowerman, Kita, Haun, & Levinson, 2004), object indivi- 
duation (Lucy, 1992), orcolour (Davidoff, Davies. & Roberson, 1999).
The best way out of the trap might be to recognise that the problem of language 
determinism vs. universal concepts is an artefact of separating linguistic meaning 
from meaningful activity. If understanding is the goal of communicative situations 
which are inherently meaningful, and language is one aspect of the structuring of 
these situations, we need to attend not only to the guiding role of language (which 
it fulfils in diverse ways across speech communities), but also to the openness of
With the deríved option of trying to combine the two. as in tlie work of Wierzbicka (e.g., 1996).
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linguistically constituted activities for understanding. Language can help us to go 
beyond conventions and social expectations — to change our worlds. The reason is 
precisely that language is a part of human life. Linguistic forms are material parts 
of tlie world that we share, and they are meaningful as part of the world. Ochs 
(1996) provides the example of female leadership talk, which has introduced not 
simply a new way of talking, but a new way of being a business leader. The reason 
that such innovation is possible is that language is only one aspect of meaningful 
activity. Crucially, an unusual form of leadership talk is still identiüable as leader­
ship talk, because of the Situation (it is 10 am on a workday, I know that she is my 
boss, I am Standing in her office...). I would expect that in order to understand bi­
lingual experience, we need to understand the openness of language to the Situation 
as well as its guiding role. The universalists’ fear of tlie idea of “language determi- 
lting tliouglit” is without foundation — not because languages are all the sanie, or 
because language diversity is irrelevant, but because language is a part of human 
life which liappens in a sliared world. This is not simply to reiterate tlie common 
Statement that the “context” somehow adds meaning to tlie linguistic “core” me- 
aning, or “selecLs” tlie appropriate meaning among a number of pre-existing ones. 
Rather, we might say that language provides structure to a meaningfulness that is 
already there in the Situation.
Mcthodological implications
In the above sections, I have attempted to formulate my feeling that the meta- 
phors most commonly employed in etlinolinguistic research lead us to miss some of 
the signilicance of language lor living diverse lives. If there is some merit to these 
arguments, what could they mean for the methodology of eomparative ethnolingu- 
istic research? Let us again consider the four types of methodological decision laid 
out by Bartmiiiski.
1) Tertium comparationis. A possible tyjie of tertium comparationis not men- 
tioned by Bartmihski are activities (clarifying expectations, booking a hotel room, 
changing nappies). For example, organising and clarifying mutual exjxictations in 
a relationship is a kind of activity that people across the world have to engage 
in. It should therefore be a viable basis for cross-linguistic comparison. Although 
this activity is clearly linguistically constituted, it would be difficult to link it to 
particular words, concepts, or objects.
2) Linguistic register. The argument provided above supjxirts Bartminski’s Sug­
gestion to focus on everyday language as the central register in each speech com- 
munity.
3) Topic area. The focus 011 activity need 110t lead to redelinitions of the to- 
pic area. However, taxonomically defined topics such as “space” or “time” would
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need to be restated according to their relevance in everyday activities. For exaniple, 
there tue clear differences in the ways in which Polish and German families leave 
the house together. The temporal coordination o f  this complicated activity takes 
recourse also to language —  although the language accompanying and structuring 
this activity need not contain particular “temporal words” such as “time ” or “now”.
4) Data. My methodological argument has focussed on tlie need to study langu­
age as part of the Situation that it helps structuring. The “timeless” methods well es- 
tablished in ethnolinguistics could be accompanied by observational, video-tajied 
data, which make it possible to leave tlie language in its finite world. Until recen- 
tly, it was diflicult to capture the evanescent nature of sjxiken language. Even when 
conversations were recorded, it would have been diflicult to take the richness of the 
Situation into account in analysing language, and communicate the results of such 
an analysis to tlie scientific community. These teclinological reasons for neglec- 
ting observational research in ethnolinguistics are quickly giving way. Of course, 
the simple availability of a new technology does not mean that it should be used. 
However, I think that observational research, which allows us to take seriously 
the contention that tlie Situation of sjieaking is “with-linguistic” (przyjçzykowa) 
(Bartminski, 1996) ratlier tlian non-linguistic, might give us a fuller “jiicture of the 
linguistic world”.
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L i n g u i s t i c  h orldviews o r  l a n g u a g e  in the world? M e t a p h o r s  a n d  m e t h o d s  in
ETHNOLINGUISTIC RESEARCH
Ethnolinguistic research has gained subslanlial popularity over the last two decades. A leading 
metaphor for the focus of these research efforts is that of the “linguistic worldviews". As laige- 
scale comparative projects on linguistic worldviews are taking shape. it might be worth rellecting on 
what this conceptualisation of ethnolinguistics excludes. The visual metaphor of pictures implies Üiat 
Speakers can step out of tlie world and view (and also name) it from the outside. Two problematic 
consequences of tlris metaphor are discussed. Firstly, the detachment of language from the world of 
activities of which it is a part leads to the adoption of a cognitivist model of linguistic meaning as a 
separate stream of communication. Such a model is inconsislent with the experienced transparency 
of language in everyday life. Secondly, tlie detachment of language from life supports the use of 
“timeless” methods, the study of words outside of their Situation (if not “context“) of use. Adopting 
these metaphors and methods. we might miss latge parts of the significance of language for everyday 
life — tlie object o f ethnoscience.
